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A-Void-Able Consequences: Void Sales &
Subsequent Purchasers Under Arkansas’s
Statutory Foreclosure Act
Imagine the following: you have lived in your home for
years. A bank holds your mortgage, and you pay promptly every
month. One day, out of the blue, you get a notice from the bank
claiming that your home has been foreclosed upon and sold to a
third party. The notice indicates that the bank determined you to
be in default, sold your home without notifying you, and now
your home is no longer yours. You rush to court to try to get your
home back. The court looks at the Arkansas statute and faces a
dilemma. Two results are possible from its language. One
assumes that the sale was not valid because it was done in
violation of the law, and you can retrieve the deed of your home
from the third-party purchaser. However, under the other
interpretation, the third party gets your home free and clear. You
can perhaps sue the bank, but your home is no longer yours.
This conundrum is exactly the problem posed by Arkansas’s
Statutory Foreclosure Act. The Statutory Foreclosure Act
articulates detailed requirements which must be satisfied before a
foreclosure is valid.1 If a lender forecloses upon a home in
violation of these requirements, the borrower has a legal claim
against the lender.2 However, the process becomes more complex
if the home is sold before the borrower can assert the claim. Even
after the property is sold, the Statutory Foreclosure Act still
permits a borrower to sue a lender if the sale was fraudulent or
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1. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-50-101 to -117 (2019).
2. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2).

38

ARKANSAS LAW NOTES

2021

violated the statutory requirements,3 but it also states that such
claim “may not be asserted against a subsequent purchaser for
value of the property.”4
The question then arises: can there be a “subsequent
purchaser for value” when the foreclosure sale was void from the
outset? Though the Arkansas Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed this issue, this Comment urges the Court to do so and
find that there may be no “subsequent purchaser for value” where
a sale is void from the moment it is made. Part I explores a brief
history of the Statutory Foreclosure Act. It establishes that the
General Assembly intended the Act to protect homeowners from
the rampant irregularities that result from unregulated nonjudicial
foreclosures.
Next, Part II examines the distinction between void and
voidable foreclosures of property, positing that Arkansas’s bar of
claims against subsequent purchasers for value applies only to
voidable (and not void) foreclosures. Part II subsequently
reviews the findings of a number of judiciaries which have
highlighted this void-voidable distinction in their states’
foreclosure processes and adjusted their rulings accordingly.
Then, Part III examines the proper application of the
Statutory Foreclosure Act, specifically its protection of
subsequent purchasers for value in light of the statutory purpose,
the distinction between void and voidable sales, and the
approaches pursued by other courts. Finally, Part III urges the
Arkansas Supreme Court to make a formal declaration clarifying
the provision and finding that purchasers of property foreclosed
upon in a void sale are not “subsequent purchasers for value”
under the meaning of the statute.
I. Courtless Chaos: Why Enact the Statutory

Foreclosure Act
To understand the purpose of the Statutory Foreclosure Act,
one must first understand the two primary foreclosure
mechanisms in Arkansas. The first mechanism is a judicial

3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(B).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C)(i).
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foreclosure.5 Judicial foreclosures have traditionally been
considered “the safe plan for all parties.”6 Commentators have
noted the advantages of judicial foreclosures, with one indicating:
The title produced by a judicial foreclosure is less
susceptible to attack than the title produced by a nonjudicial
foreclosure. This stability is due to several safeguards. First,
many potential infirmities are uncovered and resolved when
an informed chancellor oversees the proceedings. Second,
the adversarial nature of judicial foreclosure works to flush
out defects. Third, the concept of judicial finality solidifies
the decree and precludes the prospect of successful post-sale
attacks as time passes.7

The second foreclosure mechanism is a power of sale—a
foreclosure in which the property is offered for sale privately,
without involvement of the court.8 While judicial foreclosures
have been lauded,9 powers of sale (i.e., nonjudicial foreclosures)
have long been met with distrust.10 In 1882, the Arkansas
Supreme Court indicated that “[d]eeds of trust and mortgages,
with powers to be executed [out of court], belong to a class of
instruments which are watched with much jealousy by [the
courts]. . . . [T]he [courts] have been used to interfere to prevent
any unnecessary sacrifice, or unfair disregard of the rights of the
debtor.”11
Prior to the late 1980s, the abuses of the nonjudicial
foreclosure system caused courts to “scrutinize[] . . . with great
care” all powers of sale and set aside any sales not “conducted
with all fairness, regularity, and scrupulous integrity.”12 Sales
were so often “opened up for failure to appraise, for irregularity

5. See Edward H. Schieffler, Nonjudicial Foreclosure in Arkansas with the Statutory
Foreclosure Act of 1987, 41 ARK. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1988).
6. See id. at 377 (quoting Littell v. Grady, 38 Ark. 584, 589, 1882 WL 1518, at *3).
7. Id. at 376 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 373-74.
9. See Lynn Foster, Statutory Foreclosures in Arkansas: The Law and Recent
Developments, 66 ARK. L. REV. 111, 114 (2013) (“There are, however, attorneys who never
use the statutory-foreclosure statute, preferring the judicial process because of its guarantee
of due process and good title . . . backed by a court decree.”).
10. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 376-78.
11. Littell, 38 Ark. at 589, 1882 WL 1518, at *3; see also Schieffler, supra note 5, at
377-78.
12. Littell, 38 Ark. at 589-90, 1882 WL 1518, at *3-4 (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotations omitted); see Schieffler, supra note 5, at 377-78.
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in the appraisement, want of notice, and other defects” that a
purchaser could not be sure of his title until he had occupied the
property long enough to qualify as an adverse possessor.13 Such
foreclosures were also considered by courts to be “harsh” towards
borrowers and had the potential to be “oppressive, unjust, and
unfair.”14
After years of mismanaged nonjudicial foreclosures, the
Arkansas General Assembly sought to restrict the common law
power of sale by enacting the Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987.15
In the Assembly’s own words, the Act purported to “provide an
efficient and fair procedure for the liquidation of defaulted
mortgage loans to the benefit of both the homeowner and the
mortgage lender.”16
The Statutory Foreclosure Act aspired to create a fair
foreclosure process by elucidating very specific requirements for
a foreclosure to be deemed valid.17 Among other things, the Act
places particularized limitations on the entities which may initiate
a foreclosure,18 the components of a legally effective notice of
default,19 and the manner of the foreclosure sale.20 Most notably
for the purposes of this Comment, the Act grants a borrower a
cause of action when a lender does not strictly comply with the
statutory provisions.21
Despite its lofty aims of fairness and protection, the
Statutory Foreclosure Act has been met with heavy criticism

13. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 377 (quoting A. HUGHES, ARKANSAS MORTGAGES, §
323 (1930)).
14. See id. (quoting Littell, 38 Ark. at 589-90, 1882 WL 1518, at *3-4).
15. See id. at 378 & n.23 (quoting Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts
121, § 19). See generally Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121. The
Statutory Foreclosure Act intended to establish “a system of nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings as an alternative to judicial foreclosures.” Dickinson v. Suntrust Nat’l Mortg.
Inc., 2014 Ark. 513, at 3, 451 S.W.3d 576, 579.
16. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 378 n.23 (quoting Statutory Foreclosure Act of
1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121, § 19).
17. See id. at 381 (“The mechanics of the sale are designed to prevent abuses that courts
were worried about when there was lack of judicial involvement.”). The Statutory
Foreclosure Act and the requirements thereof are laid out in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-50-101
to -117 (2019).
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-103.
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-104.
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-107.
21. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2).
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based on its application in practice.22 Critics even made a diligent
attempt to repeal the Act during the regular session of the
Arkansas General Assembly in 2013.23 The critics claimed “that
statutory foreclosure in Arkansas [has] facilitated hasty and unjust
foreclosures.”24 These criticisms—and the “hasty and unjust
foreclosures” produced by the current legislation—raise the
question still unanswered by the Arkansas judiciary: what
recourse do borrowers have against third-party buyers when a
lender wholly ignores the requirements of the Statutory
Foreclosure Act?

II. A-Void-Able Consequences: Void vs.
Voidable Sales
In determining the effects that foreclosure illegalities may
have on subsequent purchasers, an important clarification must be
made. While this Comment posits that there can be no subsequent
purchasers following void sales, it does not make the same
assertion when the sale is merely voidable.25 Void sales arise
where adherence to statutes and fair notice are so wholly absent
that no title can pass.26 Voidable sales, on the other hand, usually
involve substantial but not strict compliance with the applicable
statute.27 Irregularities that might render a sale voidable include
a confusing title description, a published notice of sale that omits
the year, or “[a] sale at the east front door instead of the west front
door as prescribed by the deed of trust.”28 In voidable sales, title
22. See Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121, § 19; H.B. 1847, 89th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
23. Nate Coulter, 2013-14 University of Arkansas School of Law Student-Run Clinics
Yield Policy Insights and Practical Foreclosure Advice to Homeowners, 68 ARK. L. REV.
551, 585 (2015) (citing H.B. 1847, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013)).
24. Id.
25. Any argument that voidable sales could not create bona fide purchasers would be
futile, as the Arkansas Supreme Court has already stated: “The general rule is that a sale to
a bona fide purchaser, under a voidable execution, is valid.” Youngblood v. Cunningham,
38 Ark. 571, 577, 1882 WL 1516, at *4 (emphasis omitted).
26. See Foster, supra note 9, at 133; Byers v. Fowler, 12 Ark. 218, 274, 1851 WL 450,
at *27 (“A party to a void process could acquire no title under it.”).
27. See City Nat’l Bank v. De Baum, 166 Ark. 18, 20-21, 265 S.W. 648, 648 (1924)
(“It is admitted that the company did not comply with the provisions of the statute . . . , and
the notes are voidable for that reason.”).
28. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 391 n.98 (citing Graham v. Oliver, 659 S.W.2d 601,
604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted)).
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passes to the purchaser, but that sale may be set aside if: (1) there
were irregularities in the foreclosure proceeding, and (2) the
purchaser of the property does not take the property for new
value, in good faith, and without notice of prior interests in the
property.29
However, if a good faith purchaser buys the property at the
foreclosure sale, the title remains with that purchaser, even if the
sale is later set aside as “voidable.”30
This Comment
acknowledges that the transfer of title to “subsequent purchasers
for value” is not disrupted if the sale is merely voidable for failure
to strictly comply with the provisions of the Statutory Foreclosure
Act.31
On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
described a void sale as “a nullity, binding on no one.”32 Defects
rendering foreclosures and subsequent sales void have
traditionally included forged mortgages, instances where the
mortgagor did not actually default, and/or a failure by the seller
to follow “fundamental procedural requirements.”33 For instance,
“[s]ome procedural requirements are so fundamental, like the
notice provisions, that completely neglecting them would render
the sale void.”34
The Statutory Foreclosure Act is ultimately silent on the
effect a void sale has upon its miscellaneous provisions.35
29. Id. at 390-91 & n.99 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.20, 7.21, at 557 (2d ed. 1985); Fargason v. Edrington, 49 Ark.
207, 214, 4 S.W. 763, 764 (1887) (citation omitted)); see also Matlock v. Lomas Mortg.
U.S.A., Inc., 154 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993) (citing Union Nat’l Bank v. Nichols,
305 Ark. 274, 807 S.W.2d 36 (1991)); Bill’s Printing, Inc. v. Carder, 357 Ark. 242, 249, 161
S.W.3d 803, 807 (2004).
30. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 391 & n.99 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.20, 7.21, at 557 (2d ed. 1985); Fargason, 49
Ark. at 214, 4 S.W. at 764 (citation omitted)); see also Home Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v.
Brown, 188 Ark. 98, 100, 64 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1933) (“The fact that [the decree] was voidable
. . . could not affect the rights of an innocent purchaser who acquired the title while the
judgment was in full force and effect.”) (citing Boyd v. Roane, 49 Ark. 397, 5 S.W. 704
(1887)).
31. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C) (2019).
32. Fairbank v. Douglas, 188 Ark. 224, 227, 66 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1933) (quoting
Tallman v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 185 Ark. 851, 855, 49 S.W.2d 1039, 1041 (1932)), overruled
on other grounds by Dowell v. Land, 208 Ark. 908, 913, 188 S.W.2d 134, 136 (1945).
33. Foster, supra note 9, at 133 (quoting 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.20 (5th ed. 2007)).
34. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 390.
35. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116.
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Historically in Arkansas, when there has been a foreclosure defect
so substantial that it rendered the sale void, no title passed to the
so-called “purchaser” of the property.36 In essence, no title could
pass because no real sale was conducted.
In Craig v. Meriwether, the Arkansas Supreme Court held a
sale void where the seller did not conduct an appraisement
beforehand, as required by the statute.37 The Court found that
“when foreclosure sales of land under mortgages pursuant to
power therein conferred are regulated by statute, a sale not in
conformity with the statute is invalid.”38 It also held that no title
could transfer under the void sale, stating: “[A] sale under the
power in the mortgage without complying with the statute is
invalid . . . no title can be vested thereunder.”39
In Ford v. Nesbitt, the Court held that sales lacking proper
notice are void, stating:
One of the material things to be done was to give the notice
properly[] . . . . The property in the mortgage could not be
alienated from the mortgagors except in strict accordance
with the power therein conferred by that instrument, nor
could a court of equity assume to confirm and make valid a
sale not made in strict accordance therewith.40

While it is worth noting that the rulings in both Craig and
Nesbitt predated the Statutory Foreclosure Act, the Arkansas
judiciary has continued to hold defective sales void subsequent to
the passage of the Act.41 In 1991, the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed an appellate ruling which declared invalid a sale in
which notice was mailed after twelve days instead of the
statutorily-prescribed ten.42 Five years later, the Arkansas Court

36. Foster, supra note 9, at 133 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.20 (5th ed. 2007)); see also Terry K. Haenny, Validity of a
Void Foreclosure Judgment?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 548, 553 (1967) (finding that, when courts
render judgments without proper jurisdiction, “[n]o rights are acquired by virtue of a void
judgment, which is no judgment at all”).
37. Craig v. Meriwether, 84 Ark. 298, 303-05, 105 S.W. 585, 586-87 (1907).
38. Id. at 304, 105 S.W. at 586.
39. Id. at 305, 105 S.W. at 587.
40. Ford v. Nesbitt, 72 Ark. 267, 269, 79 S.W. 793, 794 (1904).
41. See, e.g., Henson v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 497, 892 S.W.2d 250, 253
(1995); Union Nat’l Bank v. Nichols, 305 Ark. 274, 279-80, 807 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1991).
42. Nichols, 305 Ark. at 279-80, 807 S.W.2d at 39.
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of Appeals held void a foreclosure and foreclosure sale where
process was served by the wrong deputy sheriff.43
Though the Arkansas judiciary has comfortably found a
myriad of foreclosure irregularities to render subsequent sales
void,44 it has not yet made clear its stance regarding whether title
may pass to a subsequent purchaser in a void sale. Other
judiciaries, however, have clearly addressed the question.45
Texas courts have established:
Purchasers of land from a substitute trustee’s sale are not
relieved from the necessity of inquiring whether the trustee
had been empowered to sell. One who bids on property at a
foreclosure sale does so “at his peril.” Purchasers assume
that the trustee has power to make the sale at their peril, and
where he is without power, or there is other defect or
irregularity that would render the foreclosure sale void,
then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the property.46

The Texas judiciary has ultimately determined that the
“effect of ‘good faith purchaser for value without notice’ does not
apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale” because “[a]
purchaser at a foreclosure sale obtains only such title as the trustee
had authority to convey.”47
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has established a similar
rule, indicating:
There are limits to the protections provided to bona fide
purchasers, however, and “[t]he purchaser of an apparently
perfect record title is not protected against all adverse
claims.” . . . Generally, the key question in this regard is
whether the transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity

43. Planters Bank & Tr. Co. v. Smith, No. CA 95-1156, 1996 WL 663899, at *3 (Ark.
Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1996) (citing Hubbard v. Shores Grp., 313 Ark. 498, 855 S.W.2d 924
(1993)).
44. See supra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
45. See Ralph L. Straw Jr., Off-Record Risks for Bona Fide Purchasers of Interests in
Real Property, 72 DICK. L. REV. 35, 44 & n.29 (1967) (citing cases where forged instruments
affected bona fide chain of title).
46. Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723-24 (Tex. App. 1985) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted); see Richard E. Flint, Time to Repair the Chain: Void Deeds,
Subsequent Purchasers, and the Texas Recording Statutes, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 35 (2016).
47. Flint, supra note 46, at 35 (emphasis omitted) (citing Diversified, Inc., 702 S.W.2d
at 721; Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)).
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such that title never left possession of the original owner
. . . .48

The California Supreme Court has held:
Numerous authorities have established the rule that an
instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a
forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the
foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine
of bona fide purchase.49

The Nebraska Supreme Court has followed suit, holding:
When a sale is void, “no title, legal or equitable, passes to
the sale purchaser or subsequent grantees.” In other words,
“adversely affected parties may have the sale set aside even
though the property has passed into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser.” . . . Further, even if there is a right to exercise the
power of sale, an egregious failure to comply with
fundamental procedural requirements while exercising the
power of sale will render the sale void.50

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that,
where fraud occurs, “no title passes thereby, and a bona fide
purchaser, for a valuable consideration from the person holding
the deed, stands in no better situation than such fraudulent
holder.”51 The Utah Supreme Court found that a deed which is
void “does not convey any title to the grantee, or mortgagee,
although he may be an innocent purchaser for value without
notice.”52 Likewise, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated: “But
where the deed is regarded as absolutely void, it is held that even
such a purchaser (innocent or bona fide) can obtain no title.”53

48. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 896-97 (2011) (quoting Brewster v.
Weston, 126 N.E. 271, 272 (Mass. 1920)).
49. Trout v. Taylor, 32 P.2d 968, 970 (Cal. 1934).
50. Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N.W.2d 544, 554 (Neb. 2003) (citations omitted); see also
King v. De Tar, 199 N.W. 847, 848-49 (Neb. 1924) (“From a review of all the evidence it
seems clear to us that the deed . . . was fraudulently altered in a material respect and as such
it became void, and no person, not even a bona fide purchaser, could take anything by such
deed.”).
51. Smith v. Markland, 72 A. 1047, 1050 (Pa. 1909) (quoting Van Amringe v. Morton,
4 Whart. 382, 382 (Pa. 1839)).
52. N. M. Long Co. v. Kenwood Co., 39 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Utah 1935) (finding that no
interest can be acquired by a forged deed).
53. Curry v. Hinton, 231 S.W. 217, 218 (1921) (internal quotations omitted).
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III. Not Altering but Clarifying Arkansas’s
Approach to Void Property Conveyances
Arkansas is not wholly removed from the many judiciaries
which have found there can be no subsequent purchaser in a void
sale. In 1933, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited similar
language, stating: “[O]ne purchasing land from a person who
obtained his title by forgery cannot be treated as an innocent
purchaser.”54 How then does this comport with Arkansas’s bar of
claims against a “subsequent purchaser for value” in foreclosure
proceedings?
This Comment asserts that Arkansas’s perspective on void
conveyances has not changed in light of the Statutory Foreclosure
Act. Arkansas has always sought to protect property owners.55 A
reading of the law that would fraudulently divest an unwitting
homeowner of his or her home, land, and all the memories
contained therein—with no remedy for the homeowner to recover
his or her home—would be contrary to the purposes of the Act.56
Perhaps reflective on this issue, it is important to note that
Arkansas does not recognize subsequent purchasers for value
where property is stolen.57 Under Arkansas law, stolen property
can have no subsequent purchaser, even one who is completely

54. McCarley v. Carter, 187 Ark. 282, 285, 59 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1933) (citing Bird v.
Jones, 37 Ark. 195, 1881 WL 1478); see also Straw Jr., supra note 45, at 44.
55. Property ownership is so highly regarded by the state that the Arkansas
Constitution states: “The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional
sanction.” ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22. Much the same, the Statutory Foreclosure Act was
enacted, at least in part, to protect property owners from abuse. See supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
56. Evaluating the meaning of any statute requires ascertaining the intent behind the
legislation. See State ex rel. Moose v. Trulock, 109 Ark. 556, 563, 160 S.W. 516, 517 (1913)
(citing 2 LEWIS SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 364) (“‘The intent of a
statute being the law,’ said Mr. Sutherland, ‘it necessarily follows that the object of all
interpretation is to find out that intent.’”). The Arkansas Supreme Court has held: “It is the
duty of every Court, when satisfied of the intention of the legislature, clearly expressed in a
constitutional enactment, to give effect to that intention . . . . And any construction should
be discarded that would lead to absurd consequences.” State v. Smith, 40 Ark. 431, 43233, 1883 WL 1165, at *1 (emphasis added). Permitting the hypothetical introduced at the
beginning of this Comment to occur can easily be classified as an “absurd consequence[]”
under the Arkansas precedent.
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a) (2013).
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innocent regarding the illegalities.58 Arkansas’s statute states:
“All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be
restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the
part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his or her
right to the property.”59 For a lender to illegally seize property
which is lawfully vested in one party and transfer that property to
another, is this anything other than theft?60
Now, this Comment by no means intends to suggest that
minor errors in foreclosure proceedings—though the statute does
require strict compliance61—should divest subsequent purchasers
of ownership in the property. The finality in transfer of title
guaranteed by the Statutory Foreclosure Act is hugely
advantageous and should not be uprooted for merely trivial
discrepancies, nor would the language of the Statutory
Foreclosure Act support such an interpretation.62 This Comment
simply posits that there can be no subsequent purchaser where
there is no valid sale.

IV. Conclusion
It is clear that the protections guaranteed to “subsequent
purchasers for value” were not intended to apply where the

58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a); see also Superior Iron Works v. McMillan, 235
Ark. 207, 210, 357 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1962) (“[I]t is clear that in this jurisdiction title to
stolen property remains in its rightful owner.”).
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a).
60. In Arkansas:
(a) A person commits theft of property if he or she knowingly:
(1) Takes or exercises unauthorized control over or makes
an unauthorized transfer of an interest in the property of
another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of
the property; or
(2) Obtains the property of another person by deception or
by threat with the purpose of depriving the owner of the
property.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103 (Supp. 2021).
61. In 1995, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Statutory Foreclosure Act
requires strict compliance with its provisions. See Henson v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 319 Ark. 491,
497, 892 S.W.2d 250, 253 (1995) (“Any statute which is in derogation of or at variance with
the common law must be strictly construed.”). In 2020, the Court reiterated this notion with
its decision in Davis v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, 2020 Ark. 180, at 7, 599 S.W.3d 128,
132.
62. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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foreclosure and subsequent sale were outright void.63 When the
court asks whether the unwitting homeowner can recover her
home after waking one day to find it unceremoniously ripped
away by illegal foreclosure proceedings, the answer should most
certainly be in the affirmative. Where the foreclosure sale is
wholly void and there is no subsequent purchaser, the true owner
of the home is not changed by the void sale.
This Comment implores the Arkansas Supreme Court to
clearly declare this standard. In doing so, the Arkansas judiciary
will remain true to the purposes of the Statutory Foreclosure Act,
rule consistently with well-established precedent, and properly
adhere to the fundamental fairness in property that Arkansas has
long granted its citizens.
HANNAH HUNGATE

63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C) (2019).

